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In the early 1980s, there was a number of papers on what should be
called proofs by consistency. They describe how to perform inductive proofs,
without using an explicit induction scheme, in the context of equational
specifications and ground-convergent rewrite systems. The method was
explicitly stated as a first-order consistency proof in the case of pure equa-
tional, constructor-based specifications. In this paper, we show how, in
general, inductive proofs can be reduced to first-order consistency and
hence be performed by a first-order theorem prover. Moreover, we extend
previous methods, allowing nonequational specifications (even non-Horn
specifications) and designing some specific strategies. Finally, we also
show how to drop the ground convergence requirement (which is called
Saturatedness for general clauses). ] 2000 Academic Press
1. INDUCTIVE PROOFS
First-order specifications are ubiquitous in virtually all areas of computer science. In
many cases, the intended meaning of a specification E is not its standard first-order
semantics, i.e., the class of all its models, but rather a more specific class M.
Perhaps the best known example is the initial or minimal Herbrand model semantics,
where M consists of the unique minimal Herbrand model of a set of Horn clauses with
or without equality E (an algebraic specification, a logic program, a deductive data
base, etc.). Other interesting semantics that are used in practice as well include final
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semantics, or, for possibly non-Horn specifications E, perfect model semantics or
the class of all (minimal) Herbrand models.
In this paper we address the issue of inductive proofs in this broad sense: we wish
to define general methods for (semi-)automatically (dis)proving the validity of con-
jectures C in classes of Herbrand models of E, where C and E are sets of universally
quantified clauses. In order to minimize user expertise, we do not want to require
the user of such a (semi-)automatic inductive theorem prover to provide explicit induc-
tion schemes. Instead, induction will be based on simple, automatically generated,
well-founded orderings o on terms, like the recursive path ordering [Der82]. This
is what distinguishes our approach from the explicit induction methods that will not
be addressed in this paper.
Theory imposes severe limitations on our aims. Unlike when proving standard
first-order consequences (i.e., validity in the class of all models), from Go dels
incompleteness theorem it follows that in general there are no complete proof
systems that can be used to enumerate all inductively valid formulae, and hence
inductive validity is not even semi-decidable. In Section 3 we will show that this is
the case even for validity of equations in the initial model of very restrictive classes
of specifications E, like the ones presented by purely equational, convergent, linear,
right shallow, constructor-based term rewrite systems or by a convergent set of
length-reducing word rewrite rules. This shows why almost no decidability results
for inductive validity exist in the literature: even in very restricted and simple situa-
tions the problem remains undecidable. To our knowledge, the only decidability
results are for |-complete theories, i.e., where (for infinite models) the inductive
theory coincides with the equational theory, like the shallow equational theories of
[CHJ94] or the Catalog Horn theories of [Nie96].
However, under reasonable assumptions it is possible to obtain what we will call
refutation complete procedures for inductive validity: procedures that provide in
finite time a disproof for any conjecture that is false in M. Then the situation is
exactly reversebut probably less useful in practiceto what happens in standard
first-order logic, where all formulae valid (in the class of all models of E) are
provable in finite time.
It is interesting to observe that refutation completeness for inductive validity
amounts to refutation completeness for ground conjectures: a conjecture C is valid
in M if, and only if, all its ground instances are valid (since M is a class of Herbrand
models) and one can simply enumerate (representatives of) all ground instances until
a ground counterexample is found by the ground refutation procedure. This simple
idea is in essence the basis of methods like the ones of [Red90, Zha88, BR95, Nie99]2.
Indeed refutation procedures or decision procedures for ground conjectures are
available in many practical settings, like in the presence of a convergent term rewrite
system or an adequate saturated clausal presentation for E.
In fact, if M includes all minimal Herbrand models of E (and hence, in parti-
cular, if M is the initial model of E), then refutation completeness for ground
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conjectures C, i.e., the co-semi-decidability of M<C, is equivalent to the decidability
of M<C. This is true because M<C is semi-decidable as well: since M includes
the minimal models, for every ground atom A we have M<A if, and only if, E<A
(that is, A is a first-order logical consequence of E), which is semi-decidable3.
Our techniques will extensively deal with refutation completeness, among other
reasons, because a procedure that makes progress toward a disproof when given a
false conjecture, frequently also advances towards a proof when given a valid con-
jecture. In the class of methods described in this paper, progress is made by
inference rules reducing (with respect to o) counterexamples, i.e., false ground
instances c_ of a conjecture c. Once a minimal (irreducible) counterexample
appears, it is detected by other means. Here we build upon previous work on proofs
by consistency for the purely equational case, formerly also called inductionless
induction methods, where minimal counterexamples were detected in several forms,
like equations true= false [Mus80], equations between constructors [HH82], or
ground irreducible nontrivial equations [JK86, Bac88, BL90], among others. We
generalize those methods for the detection of inconsistencies by introducing the
notion of I-axiomatization. These axiomatizations will be used in a uniform
framework for proof by consistency that allows us to eliminate many restrictions on
syntax and semantics (saturatedness requirements on E, arbitrary universal for-
mulae, more general redundancy notions and classes of models). The explicit use of
axiomatizations was introduced in [Fri84] for equational specifications with free
constructors, but not further generalized in subsequent papers.
An I-axiomatization is a set A of first-order formulae such that A _ E _ C is
consistent if, and only if, M<C. Hence, such I-axiomatizations allow us to reduce
inductive proofs to first-order consistency proofs, which in turn make it possible to
apply general-purpose first-order theorem provers to inductive validity problems.
Note that we do of course not require A to completely axiomatize M, which is
impossible in general.
The issue of how to compute I-axiomatizations automatically will be treated in
Section 7. The other main question to be answered is of course how to design
efficient4 procedures (i) proving the inconsistency of A _ E _ C whenever C is false
and (ii) proving its consistency in as many cases as possible if C is valid.
The remainder of this paper is devoted to this in a number of different situations,
depending on the intended semantics and the syntactic properties of E and C. An
important step forward is a completeness result for the following two-stage
approach which is common to our different strategies: on the one hand, new conse-
quences are computed from E _ C in a restricted way; on the other, each new
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consequence is checked for inconsistency with A. The latter can be done either by
a standard first-order prover or by a dedicatedin some cases, decisionprocedure
(see Section 8).
In Section 4 we first concentrate on the case where E is Horn, M is the minimal
Herbrand model, and C is any set of clauses. The results are hence directly
applicable to the case where M is the class of all Herbrand models if C contains
only positive clauses. Different special cases of constructor-based specifications are
handled separately in Section 5. In Section 6 we generalize these ideas to non-Horn
E and perfect model semantics.
This paper does not contain many difficult new results; its contributions are more
at the conceptual level and several proofs are actually adaptations of standard
proofs. We show, however, how inductive validity can be reduced to first-order
consistency, without the usual assumptions of the proofs by consistency method.
The main advantage is that any saturation-based general-purpose first-order
theorem prover can be used for inductive validity. For instance, we experimented
with Saturate [NN93, GNN95] for this purpose. On all (small-sized) examples we
tried, this experiment was quite successful. We reproduce some of the Saturate
proofs in the paper.
2. BASIC NOTIONS AND NOTATIONS
We use the standard definitions of [DJ90]: T(F, X) (T(F)) is the set of
(ground) terms over a set of symbols F and a denumerable set of variables X (over
F), the subterm of t at position p is denoted t |p , the result of replacing t |p by s in
t is denoted t[s]p , and syntactic equality of terms is denoted by #.
A multiset over a set S is a function M: S  N. The union of multisets is defined
as usual by M1 _ M2(x)=M1(x)+M2(x) and is sometimes simply written
M1 , M2 .
If  is a binary relation, then  is its inverse, W is its symmetric closure, +
is its transitive closure and * is its reflexive-transitive closure. We write s! t if
s* t and there is no t$ such that t  t$. Then t is called irreducible and a normal
form of s (w.r.t. ). The relation  is well-founded or terminating if there exists no
infinite sequence s1  s2  } } } and it is confluent or ChurchRosser if the relation
* b * is contained in * b *. It is locally confluent if  b * b *. By
Newman’s lemma, terminating locally confluent relations are confluent. A relation
 on terms is monotonic if s  t implies u[s]p  u[t]p for all terms s, t, and u and
positions p. A congruence is a reflexive, symmetric, transitive, and monotonic
relation on terms.
An equation is a multiset [s, t], denoted s=t, or, equivalently, t=s. A first-order
clause is a pair of finite multisets of equations 1 (the antecedent) and 2 (the succedent),
denoted by 1  2. It is a Horn clause if 2 contains at most one equation. The empty
clause g is a clause where both 1 and 2 are empty.
A rewrite rule is an ordered pair of terms (s, t), written s  t, and a set of rewrite
rules R is a term rewrite system (TRS). The rewrite relation with R on T(F, X),
denoted R , is the smallest monotonic relation such that l_R r_ for all l  r # R
and all substitution _, and if sR t then we say that s rewrites into t with R. R is
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called terminating, confluent, etc. if R is. A rewrite system R is convergent if it is
confluent and terminating; then every term t has a unique normal form w.r.t. R ,
denoted by nfR(t), and s=t is a logical consequence of R (where R is seen as a set
of equations) iff nfR(s)=nfR(t).
Let R be a set of ground equations or rewrite rules. Then the congruence W*R
defines an equality Herbrand interpretation denoted by R*, where the only
predicate = is interpreted by s=t iff W*R t. We write s=t # R* if sW*R t. R* satisfies
(is a model of) a ground clause 1  2, denoted R*<1  2, if R*$3 1 or
R* & 2{<. The empty clause g is hence satisfied by no interpretation. R*
satisfies a set of clauses S, denoted by R*<S, if it satisfies every clause in S.
A (strict partial) ordering on T(F, X) is an irreflexive transitive relation o. It is
a reduction ordering if it is well founded and monotonic and stable under substitu-
tions: so t implies s_ot_ for all substitutions _. It fulfils the subterm property if
o$f, where f denotes the strict subterm ordering.
A well-known, easily automatizable reduction ordering that is adequate for the
purposes of this paper is the recursive path ordering (RPO), which is based on a
total ordering oF (the precedence) on F. Furthermore let F be the disjoint union
of two sets lex and mul, the symbols with lexicographic and multiset status, respec-
tively, and let =mul denote the equality of terms up to the permutation of direct
arguments of symbols with multiset status.
Then RPO (with status) on ground terms is defined as follows.
s= f (s1 , ..., sm)orpo g(t1 , ..., tn)=t iff
1. si orpo t or si=mul t, for some i with 1im,
2. f oF g, and sorpo tj , for all j with 1 jn,
3. f =g, f # lex, (s1 , ..., sn) olexrpo (t1 , ..., tn) , and sorpo t j , for all j with
1 jn, or
4. f =g, f # mul, [s1 , ..., sn]omulrpo [t1 , ..., tn],
where (s1 , ..., sn) olexrpo (t1 , ..., tn) if _ jn s.t. sj orpo t j and \i<j s i=mul t i . Further-
more, omulrpo is the multiset extension of orpo , defined as the smallest ordering such
that S _ [s]omulrpo S$ _ [t1 , ..., tn] whenever S is equal to S$ up to =mul and sorpo t i
for all i in 1 } } } n.
The lexicographic path ordering is the particular case of RPO where F=lex, and
the multiset path ordering (or RPO without status) is the particular case where
F=mul.
3. LIMITATIONS
To our knowledge, the only (syntactically defined) classes of axiomatizations E
with a decidable inductive validity problem are the |-complete ones, i.e., (for
infinite I ) where the inductive theory coincides with the equational theory. This is
the case for classes like the shallow equations of [CHJ94] or the Catalog Horn
axiomatizations of [Nie96], which are both based on presentations where variables
do not occur at depth more than one.
It seems to be folk knowledge that it is difficult to go beyond. In this section we
very briefly give some insight for the reason why: even for (syntactically) very
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restricted and simple E the problem remains undecidable. We slightly adapt two
results from [KNO90] (used there for showing the undecidability of ground confluence)
in order to obtain the following:
Theorem 1. The following problem is undecidable:
INSTANCE: A finite, convergent, left- and right-linear (no variable occurs more
than once per side of a rule), right monadic (right-hand sides have depth at most 1),
constructor-based term rewrite system R and an equation s=t over T (F, X).
PROBLEM: Is s=t valid in T (F)=R?
Proof. In [KNO90] for each instance ([u1 , ..., un], [v1 , ..., vn]) of the modified
Post correspondence problem (MPCP), a rewrite system R (with the aforemen-
tioned properties) is shown to exist, such that, very roughly, all ground terms of the
form f (ui1( } } } (uik (a) } } } ), vi1( } } } (vik (a) } } } )) for ij # 1 } } } n rewrite into  and all
others into = (the symbols of the MPCP become unary function symbols and
 , = , a are constants).
Applying this construction to inductive validity: it is not difficult to see that
f (x, x)== is valid in T (F)=R if, and only if, the instance of MPCP has no
solution. K
Theorem 2. There exists a finite, length reducing, convergent (string) rewrite
system R over T (F, X), where F consists of only unary symbols (and hence there
is only one variable at each side of each rule) such that, given some constant symbol
a, the following inductive validity problem is undecidable:
INSTANCE: an equation s=t over T (F, X)
PROBLEM: Is s=t valid in T (F _ [a])=R?
Proof. The word TRS S given in [KNO90] has the required properties and has
an undecidable right equivalence problem: given two words x and y, does xwW*S yw
hold for all w? This amounts to an undecidable inductive validity problem. K
4. INDUCTIVE PROOFS AND I-AXIOMATIZATIONS
In this section we assume a finite signature F and that E is a finite set of Horn
clauses (the axioms), C is a set of clauses (the conjectures), and I is the minimal
Herbrand model of E, and we address the question whether I<C. Finally, let o
be a total reduction ordering on T (F).
For simplicity, we can assume as well that equality is the only predicate symbol,
since (positive or negative) atoms P(t1 } } } tn) can be expressed as (positive or
negative) equations P(t1 } } } tn)=true, where true is a new special symbol and P is
considered as a (Boolean) function symbol. Indeed, if I$ is the resulting minimal
Herbrand model, then clearly for every ground atom A it holds that I<A iff
I$<A=true (note, however, that I and I$ are not isomorphic since two ground
atoms that are false in I need not be in the same congruence class of I$). In what
follows, when P is a predicate symbol, we only allow equations (resp. disequations)
of the form P(s1 , ..., sn)=true (resp. their negation) which will be sometimes
abbreviated as P(s1 , ..., sn) (resp. cP(s1 , ..., sn)). In other words, equations of the
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form P(s1 , ..., sn)=Q(t1 , ..., tm) are led out by our syntax. This will be always
consistent with ordering strategies, if we assume true to be the smallest term, which
we will do in the rest of the paper.
Definition 3. A set A of first-order formulas is an I-axiomatization of I if
1. A is recursive and contains only purely universal sentences,
2. I is the only Herbrand model of E _ A up to isomorphism.
In other words, an I-axiomatization must contain enough negative information
to rule out all nonminimal Herbrand models of E, or, equivalently, it must ensure
the well-known concept of ‘‘no confusion.’’ As we mentioned before, in Section 7 we
will extensively explain how to automatically derive I-axiomatizations. Let us only
remark at this point that, since an ordering on ground terms o is available, a
convenient and intuitive way for defining I-axiomatizations is given by the following:
Definition 4. A ground term t is called normal if it is the (unique) minimal
(w.r.t. o) representative of its congruence class in I. Similarly, a ground clause c
is normal if all terms occurring in c are normal.
Lemma 5. Let A be a set of first-order clauses such that I<A and A<s{t for
any two distinct normal terms s and t. Then A is an I-axiomatization.
Proof. If J were a nonminimal Herbrand model such that J<A _ E, then
J<u=v for some ground u and v such that I<% u=v, i.e., two different congruence
classes in I are merged in J, which is impossible since A<s{t for the normal
representatives s and t of these classes. K
In the following, the particular kind of I-axiomatization given by this lemma will
be called normal, and, unless stated otherwise, we assume all I-axiomatizations to
be normal.
Example 6. Consider for E the set of equations
{ 0+x=xs(x)+y=s(x+ y).
Assuming that F=[0, s, +], an I-axiomatization could be
\x, y .s(x){0 7 (s(x)=s( y) O x=y).
Note that there is no need to express differences between terms headed by +
because they are equivalent to terms without +. Indeed if terms with + are bigger
w.r.t. o than terms built of only s and 0, then this I-axiomatization is normal.
Note that not all I-axiomatizations are normal: if a, b, c, d are constants with
aobocod and E=[a=b, c=d ] then A=[a{c] is an I-axiomatization that is
not normal (any normal one must entail b{d).
The following key proposition allows us to reduce the problem of proving an
inductive theorem to the consistency of a finite set of clauses:
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Proposition 7. Let A be an I-axiomatization. Then A _ E _ C is consistent, if,
and only if, I<C.
Proof. If I<C, then I<A _ E _ C, and hence A _ E _ C is consistent.
Conversely, if the set A _ E _ C is consistent, then it has a Herbrand model, as it
is a set of purely universal formulas. Now, by the second property of I-axiomatiza-
tions, Definition 3.2, this model should be I, since I is the only Herbrand model
of E _ A. K
4.1. Inductive saturation
As we mentioned before, our aim is to define an inference system that reduces
(with respect to o) counterexamples, i.e., the smallest false ground instance c_ of
some conjecture c in C. We will do this only if c_ is not a normal clause, since for
normal clauses we have the following:
Lemma 8. Let A be a normal I-axiomatization, let c be a clause, and let c_ be
a normal clause such that I<% c_. Then A _ [c] is inconsistent.
Proof. A _ [c_] is inconsistent if (i) every model of A satisfies the negative
literals of c_ and (ii) no model of A satisfies any of the positive ones. If I<% c_ then
I<s=t for all negative equations s=t in c_. Since s and t are both normal, it
must be the case that s#t, which implies (i). For (ii), let u=v be a positive equa-
tion u=v in c_. Since I<% c_, we have uv, and hence, since A is normal,
A<u{v and hence no model of A satisfies u=v. This implies the inconsistency
of A _ [c_] and hence of A _ [c]. K
Now it remains to design efficient procedures that are able to reduce any non-
normal counterexample. Since this is essentially a well-known problem in first-order
saturation-based theorem proving, we can rely on a large amount of existing results
from this field. We refer to [BG94] for more details and restate only the main
results.
4.1.1. Inference rules. Let us recall here only the ground versions of the follow-
ing inference rules for Horn clauses in sequent notation, where so (t, 1 ) denotes
that so t and sou for all terms u occurring in 1:
superposition right:
1 $  l=r 1  s=t
1 $, 1  s[r]p=t
if
s| p #l and
lo (r, 1 $) and so (t, 1 ).
superposition left:
1 $  l=r 1, s=t  2
1 $, 1, s[r]p=t  2
if
s | p #l and
lo (r, 1 $), so t and sp (1, 2).
equality resolution:
1, s=s  2
1  2
if sp (1, 2).
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Nonground versions of these rules are defined as usual. For example, by equality
resolution on 1, s=t  2, the conclusion 1_  2_ is obtained if _ is the most
general unifier of s and t, and s_% can indeed be the maximal term of (1, s=t  2) _%
for some ground % (the latter condition is decidable if o is some recursive path
ordering; otherwise, approximations are used and some more inferences than
needed may be computed). Also, the usual restriction in nonground superposition
that s |p must be non-variable applies here. It is also possible to further restrict the
amount of inferences by working with constrained formulae, inheriting the
generated unification and ordering restrictions as constraints [NR95].
4.1.2. Redundancy and saturation. We now use multiset extensions for lifting the
ordering o on terms to an ordering on ground equations and clauses. Let C be a
ground clause, and let emul(s=t) be [s, t] if s=t is a positive equation in C and
[s, s, t, t] if it is negative. Then we define the ordering oe on (occurrences of)
ground equations in a clause by eoe e$ if emul(e)omul emul(e$). Similarly, oc on
ground clauses is defined Coc D if mse(C) (omul)mul mse(D), where mse(C) is the
multiset of all emul(e) for ocurrences e of equations in C. When clear from the
context, we will sometimes write o instead of oe and oc . If c is a ground clause
and S is a set of clauses, we denote by SOc the set of all ground instances of clauses
of S that are smaller than c (w.r.t. o).
The following are well-known notions of redundancy in saturation-based first-
order theorem proving (see [BG94]).
Definition 9. 1. A ground clause c is redundant in a set of clauses S if SOc<c.
Similarly, a nonground conjecture c is redundant if all its ground instances are.
2. A ground inference with rightmost premise c and conclusion c$ is redundant
in a set S if S Oc<c$. Similarly, a nonground inference is redundant if all its ground
instances are.
3. A set of clauses S is saturated if all inferences with premises in S are
redundant in S.
Definition 10. 1. A theorem proving derivation is a sequence of sets of clauses
S1 , S2 , ... such that each Si+1 is obtained from Si either by adding to S i a logical
consequence of Si or by removing from Si some clause that is redundant in Si .
2. A clause is persistent in the derivation if for some j it belongs to all Sk
with k j.
3. A derivation is fair if every inference with persistent premises is redundant
in S j for some j.
Lemma 11 [BG94]. Let S1 , S2 , ... be a fair theorem proving derivation. Then the
set of persistent clauses is saturated and logically equivalent to S1 .
4.1.3. Model generation. If E is consistent and saturated under superposition
and equality resolution then the following construction produces a model R* for E
(remind that R* demotes the congruence T (F)=R) [BG94]. The construction
proceeds by induction on oc :
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Definition 12. An instance C of the form 1  l=r of a clause in E generates
the rule l  r if
1. R*C <% C,
2. lor, and (l=r)oe e for all equations e in 1,
3. l is irreducible by RC ,
where RC is the set of rules generated by all instances D of clauses in E such that
Coc D. We denote by R the set of rules generated by all ground instances of E.
Theorem 13 [BG94]. The ground TRS R is convergent. Furthermore, if E is
saturated under superposition and equality resolution then either g # E or else T(F)=R
is a model for E; i.e., E is consistent. More precisely, I is (isomorphic to) T (F)=R .
From this theorem, clearly a term (or a clause) is normal if, and only if, it is in
normal form with respect to R. Similarly, we will call a ground substitution _
normal (or irreducible by R) if x_ is normal (or irreducible by R) for all x # Dom(_).
4.1.4. Conjecture superposition. Let us assume from now on that E is saturated
under superposition and equality resolution. In Section 5.2 we will show how this
requirement can be weakened in many cases. We now define conjecture superposition,
a form of superposition where the leftmost premise is always a (definite) Horn clause
of E and the rightmost premise c is a conjecture in C:
conjecture superposition:
D 6 l=r c
(D6 c[r]p) _
if
_=mgu(c | p , l ) and c |p is not a variable, and
for some ground %:
l_%o (r_%, D_%), and, if p is inside s in a
negative literal s=t of c then s_%ot_%.
Note that in this inference rule there are strong ordering restrictions on the
leftmost premise, the clause of E, but only a weak ordering restriction on the
conjecture clause c has been imposed so far. Furthermore, here we have given the
standard nonground version of this inference rule, but again it is possible to apply
constraint inheritance. For example, the basicness restriction can be imposed, i.e.,
no inferences are needed on terms introduced by unifiers of previous inferences
generating ancestor conjectures (see [NR95, BGLS95] for the details).
4.1.5. Inductive redundancy and saturation. We now give definitions for the
redundancy of conjectures and of induction superposition inferences. They roughly
coincide with the ones given above, except that here they include the use, without
any ordering limitations, of formulae that are known to be valid in I. This includes
lemmas proved by previous runs of our method or by any other means. The essence
of induction is present in the fact that smaller (unproved) conjectures are applicable
by what could be called the induction hypothesis. Let L denote a set of lemmas,
i.e., arbitrary first-order clauses such that I<L.
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Definition 14. A ground conjecture c is redundant in a set of conjectures C if
E _ A _ L _ COc<c. Similarly, a nonground conjecture c is redundant if all its
ground instances are.
Definition 15. A ground inference by conjecture superposition with rightmost
premise c and conclusion c$ is redundant in a set of conjectures C if E _ A _ L _
COc<c$. Similarly, a nonground inference is redundant if all its ground instances
are.
Definition 16. A set of conjectures C is saturated if all inferences by conjecture
superposition with rightmost premises in C are redundant in C.
Definition 17. 1. An induction derivation is a sequence of sets of conjectures
C1 , C2 , ... such that each Ci+1 is obtained from Ci either by adding to Ci a logical
consequence of E, A, L, Ci or by removing from Ci some conjecture that is redundant
in Ci .
2. A conjecture is persistent in the derivation if for some j it belongs to all Ck
with k j.
3. A derivation is fair if every conjecture superposition inference with a
persistent rightmost premise is redundant in Cj for some j.
Regarding the question of how to compute fair derivations in practice, one can
proceed as in the standard first-order case; for example, the conjectures can be
stored in some (priority) queue, this ensuring that every conjecture c is eventually
either proved redundant or else considered for conjecture superposition; since under
our ordering restrictions adding the conclusion of an inference makes the inference
redundant, this implies the fairness of the derivation.
Theorem 18. Let A be a normal I-axiomatization. Let C0 , C1 , ... be a fair
induction derivation. Then I<C0 if, and only if, A _ [c] is consistent for all clauses
c in i Ci .
Proof. If there is some c in some Cj such that A _ [c] is inconsistent, then
I<% C0 , since all such c are logical consequences from E, A, L, C0 and I<E, A, L.
For the reverse implication, assume A _ [c] is consistent for all c in i Ci and
that I<% C0 . We will derive a contradiction from the existence of a minimal (w.r.t.
o) ground instance c_ of a clause c in i Ci such that I<% c_. If c is redundant in
some Cj then from the definition of redundancy of conjectures, it follows that there
is some false instance of a conjecture in Cj that is smaller than c_, contradicting the
minimality of c_.
Otherwise c is persistent. By Lemma 8, c_ is not a normal clause (otherwise
A _ [c] would be inconsistent). Furthermore, we can assume that _ is normal,
since otherwise _ is reducible by R into some _$ such that I<% c_$ and c_oc_$,
contradicting the minimality assumption on c_.
Hence c_ is reducible by some rule in R at some skeleton position, i.e., a position
p in c. Let D 6 l=r be the clause in E that generated the rule l%  r% of R that
reduces c_. Then (c_)|p #l% and hence c |p and l are unifiable by an mgu _$.
Furthermore, if c_ is reducible only in some negative literal s_=t_, then, since
I<s_=t_, the normal forms of s_ and t_ w.r.t. R coincide. Hence, if s_o t_,
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the maximal side s_ is reducible by R. Therefore, there exists some inference by
conjecture superposition
D6 l=r c
(D 6 c[r]p) _$
whose conclusion has an instance c_[r%]p such that I<% c_[r%]p and moreover
c_oc_[r%]p . By fairness, this conclusion is redundant in some Cj . But then from
the definition of redundancy of inferences, it follows that there is some false instance
of a conjecture in Cj that is smaller than c_, contradicting the minimality of c_. K
4.2. More Refined Orderings
Up to now, for reasons of simplicity, we have considered only an ordering o on
ground terms and clauses. However, in some redundancy proofs it is convenient to
consider more refined orderings. In particular, subsumption cannot be handled by
the redundancy notions defined up to now; for example, the equation f (a)=b is not
redundant in the presence of the equation f (x)=b.
This can be solved by techniques that are well known from the field of satura-
tion-based theorem proving [BG94, NR95] and which we do not want to treat in
detail here. Let us only mention one possibility: compare ground instances t_ and
s% of terms (or clauses) t and s by an ordering op on pairs defined by (t, _)op (s, %)
if either t_os% or else t_#s% and s subsumes t but not vice versa. The definitions
of redundancy can be adapted as follows according to this idea:
If c_ is a ground instance of a clause c and S is a set of clauses, we denote by
S Oc_ the set of all ground instances d% of clauses of S such that (c, _)op (d, %).
A ground instance c_ of a conjecture c is then redundant in a set of conjectures C
if E _ A _ L _ C Oc_<c_, and a non-ground conjecture c is redundant if all its
ground instances are.
4.3. Complete Sets of Positions
The only requirement for Theorem 18 to hold is that enough conjecture super-
position inferences are computed in order to reduce the smallest false conjecture
instance. In many cases, it is possible to determine, by analysis of a clause c,
whether there is some subset P of the positions of c such that for all reducible (by R)
c_ where _ is normal, c_ |p is always reducible for some p # P. In this case, we will
call P a complete set of positions for c (and the given E). In such a situation, it
clearly suffices to compute conjecture superposition inferences only at the positions
in P.
This generalizes a number of notions defined in the literature for the case where
E is purely equational, like the ones of [Fri86, Ku c89]. The development of tech-
niques for finding small complete sets of positions in our setting is related to the
techniques of Section 7. In the case of a constructor discipline, described in the next
section, the notion of a complete set of positions will be especially useful.
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4.4. Selection Strategies
From, e.g., [BG94], it is known that, for first-order theorem proving, superposi-
tion remains complete with selection: in each clause c an arbitrary negative literal
can be selected and the only inferences involving c are superpositions and equality
resolution steps on this selected literal.
For the purpose of proving inductive validity, conjecture superposition remains
complete with selection as well, provided we add equality resolution on selected
literals in conjectures. In the following, in each conjecture clause c (the rightmost
premise), a negative literal may have been selected:
conjecture superposition with selection:
D 6 l=r c
(D6 c[r]p) _
if
_=mgu(c |p , l ) and, for some ground %,
l_%o (r_%, D_%), and, if p is inside s in a
negative literal s=t of c then s_%o t_%, and
if a literal l in c has been selected then p is in l.
conjecture equality resolution:
l{r 6 c
c_
if
_=mgu(l, r) and
the literal l{r has been selected in l{r 6 c.
Now, inductive derivations are defined according to these rules and using any
given selection function:
Theorem 19. Let A be a normal I-axiomatization. Let C0 , C1 , ... be a fair
induction derivation with selection. Then I<C0 if and only if A _ [c] is consistent
for all clauses c in i Ci .
Proof. We have almost the same proof as for Theorem 18. Only the following
is new. Suppose I<% c_, where _ is normal. Then I<s_=t_ for all negative equa-
tions s=t in c. If one such negative equation s=t is selected in c, either (i) s_
and t_ are the same term, and then there is an inference by equality resolution on
s=t, or (ii) s_ot_ and hence s_ is not normal, and then there is an inference by
conjecture superposition on s. K
Example 20. Let us show a first proof obtained by our experimental implemen-
tation of the results given so far in the Saturate system [NN93, GNN95]. Let us
clarify that Saturate inputs are:
v the axioms (possibly with distinguished defined symbols) and conjectures
v the ordering
v the two kinds of user interaction that are explicitly shown: the selection of
literals and innermost defined symbol positions.
Then there is no further user interaction.
Let gr be a predicate symbol denoting the strict ordering on natural numbers
defined by constructors 0, s. The conjecture is the transitivity of the ordering. Note
that a user-guided negative literal selection strategy is used and that a normal I-axio-
matization could be simply the one of Example 6.
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1 : axiom gr(s(x1), 0)=true
2 : axiom gr(x1, x2)=true  gr(s(x1), s(x2))=true
3 : conje gr(x1, x2)=true, gr(x2, x3)=true  gr(x1, x3)=true
The total LPO precedence is [gr, s, 0, true]
| ?- ind.
Select negative literal in conjecture:
3 : conje gr(x1, x2)=true, gr(x2, x3)=true  gr(x1, x3)=true
Type the number (left-to-right): 1.
Inference by conjecture superposition of 1 on 3 gives:
4 : conje gr(0, x1)=true  gr(s(x2), x1)=true
Inference by conjecture superposition of 2 on 3 gives:
5 : conje gr(s(x1), x2)=true, gr(x3, x1)=true  gr(s(x3), x2)=true
Select negative literal in conjecture:
4 : conje gr(0, x1)=true  gr(s(x2), x1)=true
Type the number(left-to-right): 1.
Select negative literal in conjecture:
5 : conje gr(s(x1), x2)=true, gr(x3, x1)=true  gr(s(x3), x2)=true
Type the number(left-to-right): 1.
Inference by conjecture superposition of 1 on 5 gives:
6 : conje gr(x1, x2)=true  gr(s(x1), 0)=true
Inference by conjecture superposition of 2 on 5 gives:
7 : conje true=true, gr(x1,x2)=true,gr(x2, x3)=truegr(s(x1), s(x3))=true
clause 6 is demodulated by rules [1] giving
8 : conje gr(x1, x2)=true  true=true(tautology)
Clause 7: gr(x1,x2)=true,gr(x2, x3)=truegr(s(x1),s(x3))=true is redundant by:
2 : axiom gr(x1, x3)=true  gr(s(x1), s(x3))=true
3 : conje gr(x1, x2)=true, gr(x2, x3)=true,  >,gr(x1,x3)=true]
Induction derivation successfully terminated.
4.5. More Ordering Restrictions
In the conjecture superposition rule, inferences may involve any literal of the
conjecture c and any side of this literal, provided it is a positive one. This contrasts
with the strict superposition rules where there are more ordering restrictions. In
general, we cannot do better as shown by the following simple example:
Example 21. Assume we have only three constants a, b, c such that aoboc
and E consists of the single equation b=c. Consider the normal axiomatization
A=[a{c] and the (false) conjecture a=b. It is consistent with A and only super-
positions on the small side are possible.
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This is a bit annoying since in the classical proof by consistency for the equational
case, only superpositions on the maximal side of the equations are considered. This
is because in the classical approach the axiomatization has stronger properties,
which in our setting can be generalized as follows:
Definition 22. A is a strongly normal axiomatization if I<A and, moreover,
for all ground terms s, t such that s is minimal in its congruence class, so t and
I<% s=t, we have A<s{t.
Note that in strongly normal axiomatizations we not only require A<s{t when
s and t are distinct normal terms, like in normal axiomatizations, but also when s
is normal and so t. Actually most I-axiomatizations of Section 7 are strongly
normal.
Lemma 23. Every strongly normal axiomatization is normal, and hence it also is
an I-axiomatization.
Proof. This follows from the totality of the ordering on ground terms. K
If the conjecture superposition rule is restricted to inferences on maximal sides of
conjecture literals only, we obtain a new definition of induction derivation (let us
call it restricted induction derivation) of which the classical inductive completion
methods are an instance. And we still have the analog of Theorem 18:
Theorem 24. If A is a strongly normal axiomatization and C0 , C1 , ... is a fair
restricted induction derivation, then I<C0 if, and only if, A _ [c] is consistent for
all clauses c in i Ci .
The proof requires only a slight modification of the proof of Theorem 18.
5. CONSTRUCTORS
Usually, the structure of a specification with Herbrand model semantics can be seen
as a set of constructor symbols F0 axiomatized by a set E0 , to which (repeatedly) the
complete definition of a new symbol has been added. For example, one can specify the
natural numbers with constructors 0 and s, then define + in terms of 0 and s, then
define V in terms of the 0, s, +, then define exp in terms of 0, s, +, V, etc.
More formally, along this section we assume the following setting. Let F=F0 _ D.
F0 is a nonempty set of constructor symbols and D is a set of defined symbols. We
assume that E0 is a saturated subset of E built over T (F0 , X). Terms in T (F0 , X)
are called constructor terms. The constructors are called free if E0 is empty (or con-
sists of only tautologies). Defined symbols will be denoted by f1 , f2 , ... .
We will assume that terms in T(F0) are always smaller in the ordering than terms
in T(F"F0). This is easily achieved in general-purpose orderings like LPO or RPO,
for which it suffices to define the precedence on symbols in such a way that f og
for every f # D and every g # F0 .
In addition, we will assume that E is sufficiently complete; that is, for every
ground term s there is some ground constructor term t such that E<s=t.
165INDUCTION AND FIRST-ORDER CONSISTENCY
This specification method is very general and, at the same time, convenient for
our proof techniques for three main reasons. First, if A is a normal I-axiomatiza-
tion for E0 , then it is one as well for E, since the normal terms are constructor
terms. In the particular case of free constructors, A simply states that constructor
terms are different. Second, by enriching in this way a saturated set E0 with the
definition of a new symbol, usually the resulting set E$ will be saturated as well. If
this is not the case, we can still apply our techniques in many cases, as shown in
Subsection 5.2. The third reason is explained in the next subsection: one can restrict
the conjecture superposition inferences to a smaller subset of positions.
5.1. Constructors and Complete Sets of Positions
In this subsection, in addition to the constructor-based setting, we assume E to
be saturated. As we mentioned before, for Theorem 18 to hold we need enough
conjecture superposition inferences in order to reduce the smallest false conjecture
instance. Since, by sufficient completeness, all ground terms headed by a defined
symbol f must be reducible by R, we have the following result:
Lemma 25. If p is an innermost occurrence of a defined symbol f in a conjecture
c, then P=[ p } p$ | p } p$ is a position of c] is a complete set of positions.
Now suppose it is known that, for some defined symbol f, all terms of the form
f (t1 , ..., tn) are reducible at the topmost position if the arguments ti are constructor
terms. Then the set [ p] is already a complete set of positions if c |p is such a term
f (t1 , ..., tn). In most specifications, this is indeed the case, since, in order to ensure
sufficient completeness, the axioms defining f are usually precisely written like this.
A simple particular case is:
Lemma 26. In the case of free constructors, if p is an innermost occurrence of a
defined symbol f in a conjecture c, then [ p] is a complete set of positions.
Example 27. If constructors are not free, [ p] needs not be complete. Let g, a, b
be constructors axiomatized by the convergent TRS
[g(a)  a, g(g(x))  g(x)].
Let f be completely defined by:
[ f (a)  a, f (b)  b, f ( g(b))  b].
Then some ground instances of f (g(x)) (by irreducible ground substitutions) are
irreducible at the topmost position. The root position alone is not inductively
complete and, indeed, only overlapping at root position with the conjecture
f (g(x))=b would yield a tautology, whereas the conjecture is false ( f (g(a)) 
f (a)  a).
In practice, it is usually easy to determine for each defined symbol f whether all
f (t1 , ..., tn) with constructor arguments are reducible at the topmost position or not,
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and hence, whether [ p] is complete or the weaker result of Lemma 25 has to be
applied.
In practice, when computing a derivation, when and how is an innermost defined
symbol of a conjecture c selected for determining a complete set of positions P? A
practical implementation includes a mechanism for ensuring fairness that eventually
obliges every (apparently) persistent conjecture c to be considered for inference
computation. Selection of P for a conjecture c can be done at the moment c is going
to be considered for superposition or before. This can be done automatically, by
some heuristic, or by user interaction.
5.2. Dropping Saturatedness: Reductive Definitions
Sufficient completeness is an undecidable property even for finite convergent
string rewrite systems [KNZ87]. For convergent TRS where o fulfills the afore-
mentioned requirements, decidability can be recovered: then the property of
sufficient completeness is equivalent to the ground reducibility of f (x1 , ..., xn),
where the xi are pairwise distinct variables, for every defined symbol f [JK89].
But this result does not provide a means to effectively construct sufficiently
complete specifications, and in cases where the result does not apply, like when E
is not saturated, sufficient completeness has to be ensured in some other way.
The following is a standard method to do this by axiomatizing each defined
symbol f in such a way that all ground terms containing f are, in a certain general
sense, reducible, but without any saturatedness requirement. Below we show that this
more general notion of reducibility will suffice not only for obtaining sufficient
completeness, but also for the applicability of our techniques for inductive theorem
proving in nonsaturated E.
Definition 28. Let E be a (possibly nonsaturated) constructor-based specifica-
tion where E=E0 _ E1 is a set of Horn clauses.
Furthermore, assume that for every ground term s of the form f (t1 , ..., tn) where
tj # T (F0) for j # 1 } } } n and f # D, there is some clause in E1 with an instance
1 O l=r such that E<1, l=s, l is headed by f, and so (1, r).
Then E is called a reductive definition.
Lemma 29. Every reductive definition E is sufficiently complete.
Proof. By contradiction. Let u be the smallest term (w.r.t. o) in T (F) such
that E<u=v for no v in T (F0). Let s be an innermost nonconstructor subterm of
u. Then s is of the form f (t1 , ..., tn), where the tj are constructor terms and f # D.
Hence there is some clause in E1 with an instance 1 O l=r such that E<1, l=s,
l is headed with f, and sor. But then E<s=r, and hence E<u[s]p=u[r]p , with
u[s]p ou[r]p , contradicting the minimality of u. K
We believe that most practical cases of sufficiently complete nonsaturated specifica-
tions can be covered by this notion of reductive definition. For instance, consider the
following example from [KZ95]. It is interesting because for the authors it is supposed
to illustrate the weakness of the proof by consistency approach.
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Example 30.
E={
x+0=x
s(x)+ y=s(x+ y)
gcd(0, x)=x
gcd(x, 0)=x
gcd(x, x+ y)=gcd(x, y)
gcd(x+ y, y)=gcd(x, y)
This E is not saturated and cannot be turned into a finite saturated (or convergent)
set of equations (even modulo the commutativity of +). Furthermore, note that the
definition of gcd is clearly reductive: for every term s of the form gcd(sn(0), sm(0)),
if n=0 or m=0 then s is equivalent to the smaller sn(0) or to sm(0); otherwise
w.l.o.g. let m=n+n$; then E<gcd(sn(0), sn+n$(0))= gcd(sn(0), sn(0)+sn$(0)), which
can be reduced by the fifth rule into gcd(sn(0), sn$(0)), which is smaller w.r.t. o than
s. The definition of gcd is hence complete by the previous lemma.
Indeed, since reductive definitions E are not saturated in general, our techniques
as explained in Section 4 are not refutation complete anymore. For instance, in the
previous example, we cannot disprove a false conjecture like gcd(x, x)=0, since the
only conjecture superposition inferences produce 0=0, and gcd(x, x)=0 can be
consistent with a normal I-axiomatization A.
The cause of this problem is that Theorem 18 requires every counterexample to
be reducible, which is not the case for gcd(x, x)=0, whose minimal false instance
gcd(s(0), s(0))=0 is not reducible by E. However, a more careful analysis reveals
that this problem does not appear if the false conjecture has some subterm of the
form gcd(x, y) where x and y are distinct variables. Then, for every instance gcd(s, t)
of it there exists an equivalent instance gcd(s$, t$) that is reducible to some r such that
gcd(s, t)or, which suffices for Theorem 18. These ideas lead us to the following.
Definition 31. A definition pattern is a term of the form f (x1 , ..., xn) where f is
a defined symbol and xi and xj are distinct variables for 1i, jn where i{j.
Lemma 32. Let E be a reductive definition and let c be a conjecture such that c |p
is a definition pattern. Then for every ground instance c_ where _ is normal, there
exists some inference by conjecture superposition at position p with a conclusion c$
and a normal substitution _$ such that I<% c_ implies I<% c$_$, and furthermore,
c_oc$_$.
Proof. Let c |p be f (x1 } } } xn) and let s be f (x1 } } } xn) _. By Definition 28, there
exists an instance c2 6 l=r of a clause c1 in E1 such that E<l=s, l is headed with
f, and so (c2 , r). Furthermore, since _ is normal, lpsor. Hence there exists an
inference of c1 on c, whose conclusion has an instance of the form c2 6 c_[r]p with
the desired properties. K
From Lemma 32, it is clear that if c |p is a definition pattern, then [ p] is some-
thing similar to what we called before a complete set of positions of c. Indeed,
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below we will see that it plays the same role. As a consequence, in the remainder
of this section we assume that every conjecture c has a selected position p(c) (or
simply p) such that the symbol at c |p is an innermost defined symbol.
Definition 33. An induction derivation C1 , C2 , ... is reductively fair if for every
persistent conjecture c the term c |p is a definition pattern and every conjecture
superposition on c at p is redundant in Cj for some j.
Theorem 34. Let A be a normal I-axiomatization. Let C0 , C1 , ... be a reductively
fair induction derivation. Then I<C0 if, and only if, A _ [c] is consistent for all clauses
c in i Ci .
Proof. We again replicate the proof of Theorem 18, but now without using the
saturatedness property, which was used for showing that if c_ is not normal then
c_ is reducible by R. The purpose of this was to show that, for nonnormal c_ such
that I<% c_, there is a conjecture superposition yielding a smaller false conjecture.
However, this part can be replaced with the result of Lemma 32 and the rest of the
proof is the same. K
The previous theorem leaves us with the problem of how to achieve reductive
fairness when a certain conjecture c appears such that c has no definition pattern
and c cannot be proved redundant either. Hence this kind of derivation may fail.
In order to completely avoid failure, instead of requiring reductive fairness, we
now slightly generalize the inference rule of conjecture superposition that handles
persistent conjectures c without definition pattern in a different way. This is done
by abstracting out some subterms of c, creating a logically equivalent conjecture c$
that does have a definition pattern subterm:
Definition 35. Let c be a clause and let c | q be a term t. Then the (logically
equivalent) clause x{t 6 c[x]q is called a variable abstraction of c.
Definition 36. Let c be a conjecture and let p the selected innermost defined
symbol in c. Let c$ be the clause obtained from c by the smallest number of variable
abstraction steps such that c$ |p is a definition pattern. Furthermore, let d be a
clause obtained by conjecture superposition on the position p in c$.
Then we say that d can be obtained from c by an inference of conjecture super-
position with abstraction.
Now we can state the corresponding results of Lemma 32 and Theorem 34 for
conjecture superposition with abstraction.
Lemma 37. Let E be a reductive definition and let c be a conjecture such that c |p
is headed by a defined symbol. Then for every ground instance c_, there exists some
inference by conjecture superposition with abstraction at position p, whose conclusion
d has an instance d_$ such that I<% c_ implies I<% d_$, and moreover c_od_$.
Proof. The proof is similar to the one of Lemma 32. Let c_ |p be the term t of
the form f (t1 } } } tn) _ with f # D. Let s be the term f (s1 } } } sn), where each si is a
minimal constructor representative of ti_ and hence tps. By Definition 28, there
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exists an instance c2 6 l=r of a clause c1 in Di such that E<l=s, l is headed with
f and so (c2 , r). Furthermore, since the s i are minimal, lpsor.
The clause c by abstraction becomes a clause c$ of the form
c[ f (x1 } } } xn)] p 6 x1 {t1 6 } } } 6 xn {tn .
Hence as in Lemma 32 there exists an inference of c1 on c$, whose conclusion has
an instance of the form c2 6 c_[r]p 6 s1=t1 6 } } } 6 sn {tn with the desired
properties: since all additional literals are smaller than the one containing the
original f (t1 } } } tn), the final result is smaller. Note that since t is replaced with
something smaller, even if a finite number of equations between proper subterms of
t is added, this still yields a smaller clause w.r.t. oc . K
Theorem 38. Let A be a normal I-axiomatization. Let C0 , C1 , ... be a fair
induction derivation with respect to conjecture superposition with abstraction. Then
I<C0 if, and only if, A _ [c] is consistent for all clauses c in i Ci .
The proof is the same as for Theorem 34, replacing Lemma 32 with Lemma 37.
Example 39. Continuing with Example 30, here we show the proof of com-
mutativity of gcd by the Saturate system. Let us recall that Saturate inputs are the
ordering, the axioms, the conjectures and the defined symbols if any. Reductiveness
is not automatized in Saturate. The two phases (deduction and inconsitency detection)
are performed separately.
Note that the commutativity of + is used as a lemma and that indeed for all
conjectures a definition pattern is selected.
1 : axiom 0+x1=x1
2 : axiom s(x1)+x2=s(x1+x2)
3 : axiom gcd(x1, 0)=x1
4 : axiom gcd(0, x1)=x1
5 : axiom gcd(x1, x1+x2)=gcd(x1, x2)
6 : axiom gcd(x1+x2, x2)=gcd(x1, x2)
7 : lemma x1+x2=x2+x1
8 : conje gcd(x1, x2)=gcd(x2, x1)
The total LPO precedence is [gcd, +, s, 0]
| ?- ind.
Select innermost defined symbol in conjecture:
8 : conje gcd(x1, x2)=gcd(x2, x1)
Type the number (left-to-right) of symbol: 1.
Inference by conjecture superposition of 3 on 8 gives:
9 : conje x1=gcd(0, x1)
Inference by conjecture superposition of 4 on 8 gives:
10 : conje x1=gcd(x1, 0)
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Inference by conjecture superposition of 5 on 8 gives:
11 : conje gcd(x1, x2)=gcd(x1+x2, x1)
Inference by conjecture superposition of 6 on 8 gives:
12 : conje gcd(x1, x2)=gcd(x2, x1+x2)
Clause 9: x1=gcd(0, x1) is redundant by instances:
4 : axiom gcd(0, x1)=x1
clausal rewrite proof:
by 4 we get x1=x1
Clause 10: x1=gcd(x1, 0) is redundant by instances:
3 : axiom gcd(x1, 0)=x1
clausal rewrite proof:
by 3 we get x1=x1
Clause 11: gcd(x1, x2)=gcd(x1+x2, x1) is redundant by instances:
7 : lemma x1+x2=x2+x1
6 : axiom gcd(x1+x2, x2)=gcd(x1, x2)
8 : conje gcd(x1, x2)=gcd(x2, x1)
clausal rewrite proof:
by 7 we get gcd(x1, x2)=gcd(x2+x1, x1)
by 6 we get gcd(x2, x1)=gcd(x1, x2)
by 8 we get gcd(x2, x1)=gcd(x2, x1)
Clause 12: gcd(x1, x2)=gcd(x2, x1+x2) is redundant by instances:
7 : lemma x1+x2=x2+x1
5 : axiom gcd(x1, x1+x2)=gcd(x1, x2)
8 : conje gcd(x1, x2)=gcd(x2, x1)
clausal rewrite proof:
by 7 we get gcd(x1, x2)=gcd(x2, x2+x1)
by 5 we get gcd(x2, x1)=gcd(x1, x2)
by 8 we get gcd(x2, x1)=gcd(x2, x1)
Induction derivation successfully terminated.
Example 40. Again continuing with Example 30, here we show the refutation of
gcd(x, x)=0 by Saturate. The input is the same as in the previous example, except
that the conjecture, after abstraction for creating a definition pattern, is now:
8 : conje x1=x2  gcd(x1, x2)=0
...
in consistency detected:
24 : conje  x1=0
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Disproof:
input: 1 : axiom 0+x1=x1
input: 4 : axiom gcd(0, x1)=x1
input: 6 : axiom gcd(x1+x2, x2)=gcd(x1, x2)
input: 8 : conje x1=x2  gcd(x1, x2)=0
conjecture superp. of 6 on 8
12 : conje x1+x2=x2  gcd(x1, x2)=0
conjecture superp. of 4 on 12
21 : conje 0+x1=x1  x1=0
demodulation of 21 by 1
24 : conje x1=0
Example 41. Without any lemmas, we now prove gcd(x, x)=x, which by abstrac-
tion becomes: 7 : conje x1=x2  gcd(x1, x2)=x1
1 : axiom 0+x1=x1
2 : axiom s(x1)+x2=s(x1+x2)
3 : axiom gcd(x1, 0)=x1
4 : axiom gcd(0, x1)=x1
5 : axiom gcd(x1, x1+x2)=gcd(x1, x2)
6 : axiom gcd(x1+x2, x2)=gcd(x1, x2)
7 : conje x1=x2  gcd(x1, x2)=x1
...
Inference by conjecture superposition of 3 on 7 gives:
8 : conje x1=0  x1=x1 (tautology)
Inference by conjecture superposition of 4 on 7 gives:
9 : conje 0=x1  x1=0 (tautology)
Inference by conjecture superposition of 5 on 7 gives:
10 : conje x1=x1+x2  gcd(x1, x2)=x1
Inference by conjecture superposition of 6 on 7 gives:
11 : conje x1+x2=x2  gcd(x1,x2)=x1+x2
Inference by conjecture superposition of 1 on 10 gives:
12 : conje 0=x1  gcd(0, x1)=0
Inference by conjecture superposition of 2 on 10 gives:
13 : conje s(x1)=s(x1+x2)  gcd(s(x1), x2)=s(x1)
clause 12 is demodulated by rules [4] giving
14 : conje 0=x1  x1=0 (tautology)
Clause 13: s(x1)=s(x1+x2)  gcd(s(x1), x2)=s(x1) is redundant
by instances:
...
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Inference by conjecture superposition of 1 on 11 gives:
15 : conje x1=x1  gcd(0, x1)=0+x1
Inference by conjecture superposition of 2 on 11 gives:
16 : conje s(x1+x2)=x2  gcd(s(x1), x2)=s(x1)+x2
clause 15 is demodulated by rules [1, 4] giving
17 : conje x1=x1 (tautology)
clause 16 is demodulated by rules [2] giving
18 : conje s(x1+x2)=x2  gcd(s(x1), x2)=s(x1+x2)
Clause 18: s(x1+x2)=x2  gcd(s(x1), x2)=s(x1+x2) is redundant
by instances:
...
Induction derivation successfully terminated.
The redundancy proofs of 13 and 18 are left out here, because they are quite long,
although easy: for 13, instances s(x1)+x2=s(x1+x2) of 2 are used to enable the
instance gcd(s(x1), s(x1)+x2)= gcd(s(x1), x2) of 5 and then create s(x1)=s(x1+x2)
 gcd(s(x1), s(x1+x2))=s(x1) which is subsumed by 7. The redundancy proof of 18
is similar, using 6 instead of 5.
6. NON-HORN AXIOMS
It is well known that if E contains some non-Horn axiom, then in general longer
a unique minimal Herbrand model no exists. For example, if E#[ p 6 q] then both
the models [ p] and [q] are minimal.
A total reduction ordering o on ground literals provides a way to single out one
of the minimal models, the so-called perfect model (of E and o). The perfect model
is the minimal one with respect to the set extension o&1set of o
&1. If E#[ p 6 q]
and qop then [ p]o&1set [q] and hence [q] is the perfect model (see [BG91] for
details).
In logic programming, the ordering o is usually induced from the way non-Horn
clauses are written: one positive atom is written in the head of the clause, and the
other ones are written negatively in the tail. For instance, p 6 q can be written
p:&cq or q:&cp. Heads are made big in the ordering. If the resulting ordering
is not contradictory, then the program has a perfect model: roughly, a logic program
with negation E is called (locally) stratified if there is some ordering o such that
for all ground instances of clauses A:&A1 , ..., An , cB1 , ..., cBm it holds that
ApAi and AoBj for i # 1 } } } n j # 1 } } } m [Prz88].
Local stratification is too strong a condition for the existence of a perfect model,
and it has been relaxed into weak stratification, where, roughly, only ground instances
contributing to the model need to fulfill the requirements [PP90]. These ideas are
generalized and extended to arbitrary clausal specifications with equality in [BG91].
There it is shown that the perfect model of E is precisely T (F)=R , where R is the TRS
generated by the saturation of E with respect to o. Apart from the aforementioned
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inference rules of superposition and equality factoring, for non-Horn clauses rules
for factoring and merging paramodulation are needed as well (see again [BG91] for
details).
If we assume that E is saturated under this inference system, our techniques for
inductive theorem proving for Horn E given in the previous sections smoothly extend
to the non-Horn case and perfect model semantics.
We consider normal terms, clauses, substitutions, and I-axiomatizations with respect
to the perfect model, and normality in this sense coincides again with irreducibility with
respect to R, the ground TRS generated by the saturated set of axioms E. The ordering
restrictions for the inference rule for conjecture superposition are now slightly more
complicated, since the left premise D 6 l=r can now be non-Horn. In this case (for
ground clauses; at the nonground level this has to be expressed as explained in
Section 4). cannot require l to be the strictly maximal term anymore. Instead one
can impose that lor and lou for all terms u occurring in negative equations in
D, and lp l $ for all other positive equations l $=r$, and if l#l $ then ror$.
Theorem 42. Let I be the perfect model of a saturated set E, let A be a normal
I-axiomatization, and let C0 be any set of universal conjectures. Let C0 , C1 , ... be a
fair induction derivation with respect to non-Horn conjecture superposition.
Then I<C0 if, and only if, A _ [c] is consistent for all clauses c in  i Ci .
The results of [GS92] are closely related to our previous theorem. In both
approaches, validity is proved by finite saturation: in our case under conjecture
superposition and in their case, after an encoding by gnd predicates, by a larger set
of inference rules with selection. They refer to perfect model semantics, as we do
here, and also were the first to state the close relationship between redundancy
(defined very similarly to the way it is done here) and inductive theorem proving.
But the methods are different in essence, however. We derive minimal counterexamples
with respect to normal I-axiomatizations, whereas in [GS92] counterexamples are
required to be ground: it is assumed that validity of ground clauses is decidable,
and essentially the saturation with their encoding by gnd predicates amounts to an
enumeration of the ground instances of the conjectures. Hence their method is more
similar to the methods of [Red90, Zha88, BR95] which we mentioned in Section 1,
than to proof by consistency.
7. COMPUTING I-AXIOMATIZATIONS
In the previous sections, we designed inductive saturation methods, leaving two
unanswered questions:
1. how is it possible to compute a (strongly) normal I-axiomatization?
2. how do we derive (in)consistency?
When the normal I-axiomatization is finite, it is easy to answer the second question:
any saturation-based theorem prover can be used. We will see, however, that it is
sometimes useful to consider infinite axiomatizations A, in which case we have to
address the second question. That is, what we do in Section 8.
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Concerning the first question, we will see below how the work which has been
done on proofs by consistency in equational theories can be reformulated in our
framework: for instance, each of the procedures given in [Mus80, HH82, Bac88,
JK89], which were designed in a pure equational setting, is an inductive saturation
procedure corresponding to some (implicit) I-axiomatization.
We give in Sections 7.1 and 7.2 the axiomatizations corresponding respectively to
[Mus80] and [HH82]. Then we sketch how I-axiomatizations can be computed
when E is a set of Horn clauses without equality in Section 7.3. Finally, we give a
general I-axiomatization for an arbitrary saturated set of axioms (or an extension
of it with sufficiently complete definitions) in Section 7.4. However, such an I-axiomati-
zation, though recursive, will be infinite; we delay the problem of (in)consistency proofs
for such axiomatizations until Section 8.
7.1. Musser’s Approach
Musser in [Mus80] assumes that E is a convergent rewrite system such that
there is a particular function symbol eq satisfying, for all terms s and t not contain-
ing true, false, eq, that eq(s, t)=E true  s=E t and eq(s, t)=E false  s{E t.
Moreover, true and false are assumed to be irreducible.
This corresponds to a very simple I-axiomatization:
Lemma 43. With Musser’s assumptions [true{ false] is an I-axiomatization.
Proof. I<A as true{E false as soon as the initial algebra is not trivial. If
M<E _ A, then, for any two ground terms s, t, if I<% s=t, then the normal forms
of s and t are different. It follows that E<eq(s, t)= false; hence M<eq(s, t)= false.
Since M<true{ false, M<% eq(s, t)=true; hence M<% s=t.
For any two ground terms, we have M<s=t iff I<s=t. If M is a Herbrand
model, it is isomorphic to I. K
This axiomatization is not normal. However, a strongly normal I-axiomatization
can be obtained in an easy way. Consider
A=Deq _ [s{t  eq(s, t)= false],
where Deq is the set of equations which defines eq.
Lemma 44. With Musser’s assumptions A is a (strongly normal) finite
I-axiomatization.
Proof. I<A follows from the assumptions. Ground terms that are minimal in
their equivalence class are irreducible by convergence of E. Now, if so t and s is
an irreducible ground term, then s{E t, hence eq(s, t)=D false by hypothesis. Then
A<eq(s, t)= false, hence A<s{t. K
Note that the definition of eq does not need to be put inside E any more and that
we do not need the property eq(s, t)=E true  s=E t. Actually, Musser’s conditions
imply that, roughly, there is an equational I-axiomatization.
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7.2. Huet and Hullot’s Approach
Huet and Hullot introduced [HH82] the constructor disciplines. This corresponds
to the following axiomatization, as noticed by Fribourg [Fri84]:
\x1 , ..., xn , y1 , ..., yn . c(x1 , ..., xn)=c( y1 , ..., yn) O x1= y1 7 } } } 7 xn= yn
For every constructor symbol c
\x1 , ..., xn , y1 , ..., ym . c(x1 , ..., xn){c$( y1 , ..., ym)
For every pair of distinct constructors c, c$.
Huet and Hullot assume, moreover, that E is given by a convergent rewrite system
and that pure constructors ground terms are smaller than terms which contain at
least a defined symbol. (Besides, every definition of a symbol is supposed to be
sufficiently complete with respect to the constructors).
Lemma 45. Under these assumptions, the above axioms form a (strongly) normal
finite I-axiomatization.
Proof. If s, t are ground terms such that sot and s is minimal in its equivalence
class. By convergence, s is irreducible; hence s is a constructor term. Moreover, t
being smaller is also a constructor term. Since s, t are distinct, it follows that
A<s{t. K
This extends in a straightforward way to reductive specifications:
Lemma 46. If E is a reductive definition, then Huet and Hullot’s axiomatization
is strongly normal.
Proof. This follows from Lemma 29. K
7.3. Domain Closure and Axiomatization Computation
Now we want to design a general procedure for the computation of (strongly)
(normal) I-axiomatizations. For this purpose, we start with a known procedure for
Horn-clauses without equality which we borrow from the logic programming area.
The idea is to use a domain closure axiom to compute a set of Horn clauses which
defines the negation of the predicates. Such a computation is valid in the least fixed
point of the set of Horn clauses and is used in the ‘‘explicit negation as failure’’
[Stu91].
The following is known as Clark’s completion [Cla78]: write every set of clauses
whose head has a top predicate P as a single implication,
P(x1 , ..., xn) o ,,
where x1 , ..., xn are variables and , is a disjunction of conjunctions of the form
_y .x1 #t1 7 } } } 7 xn #tn 7 B,
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B being the body of the clause whose head is P(t1 , ..., tn). In the least fixed point
of the set of clauses, the converse implication holds; hence, in this model, we have
cP(x1 , ..., xn) o c,.
Now, we may use a quantifier elimination procedure for the theory of finite trees
and get a definition of cP. (See, e.g., [Com91] for more details on the quantifier
elimination procedures). The only weakness is that, if some clauses contain variables
in the body which do not appear in the head, then universal quantifiers cannot always
be eliminated. However, if this is not the case, then the result is an I-axiomatization.
Lemma 47. If we assume that all variables occurring in the body of the clauses
also occur in the head of the clause, then the above procedure computes a strongly
normal I-axiomatization for Horn clauses without equality.
Proof (sketch). I<A and A satisfies E<% P(t1 , ..., tn)=true if, and only if,
A<P(t1 , ..., tn){true. Since true is the smallest term, this guarantees the strong
normality property. K
Example 48. Let us consider the most simple example of Horn clauses.
E(0)
E(s(s(x))) o E(x)
Then we write
E(x) o (x#0) 6 (_y .x#s(s( y)) 7 E( y)).
By negating both members we get
cE(x) o (x0) 7 (\y .xs(s( y)) 6 cE( y)),
which gives after quantifier elimination
cE(x) o (x#s(0) 6 (_z .x#s(s(z)) 7 cE(z))),
and hence the I-axiomatization:
A={ cE(s(0))cE(s(s(x))) o cE(x).
Another simple example is the definition of the strict ordering on natural
numbers:
Example 49.
s(x)>0
s(x)>s( y) o x> y
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whose axiomatization can be computed, yielding:
A={ 0>3 xs(x)>3 s( y) o x>3 y.
Note that in the case of Horn clauses without equality, proof by consistency is
actually a negation as failure rule.
7.4. A Strongly Normal I-Axiomatization for Any Saturated E
Jouannaud and Kounalis introduced in [JK86] the notion of ground reducibility
in a pure equational setting: if E is a ground convergent rewrite system (hence
saturated), then a term s is ground reducible when all its ground instances are reducible.
The equation s=t is inconsistent when so t and s is not ground reducible. This
corresponds to the following axiomatization,
A=[s{t | s, t # T(F), cRed(s), sot],
where Red is the predicate which holds true on ground terms which are reducible
by the convergent ground rewrite system R of Theorem 13.
Lemma 50. When E is finite and saturated, the above set A is a strongly normal
I-axiomatization.
Proof. I<A since, by Theorem 13 and saturatedness of E, I is isomorphic to
T(F)=R and, by ground convergence of R, for all ground terms s, t, R<s=t and
so t implies that the normal forms of s and t are identical; hence s is reducible.
Let s be a minimal ground term in its equivalence class and t be a ground term
such that so t and I<% s=t. s is irreducible by minimality; hence s{t # A, by
definition. K
Of course, this result can be extended to finite sets of clauses E which are
sufficiently complete w.r.t. a saturated subset E0 .
8. (IN)CONSISTENCY PROOFS FOR A _ [c]
Our deduction procedure reduced the consistency of E _ A _ C to the consistency
of each single conjecture c with A. It remains to explain how we (dis)prove such simple
consistency results.
We have seen that there are simple finite normal I-axiomatizations for constructor-
based specifications. For such axiomatizations A, the consistency of A _ [c] is easily
decided.
If we do not assume a constructor-based specification, we have still the normal
axiomatization A of Section 7.4. However, such an A is infinite and hence it
cannot be computed in extension. Our purpose here is to show how such a set of
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axioms can be effectively handled by lifting the ground disequalities at a nonground
level and using again a general purpose consistency prover.
Our first concern is to show that existing methods for the pure equational case
(e.g., [JK86] and [Bac88]) can be abstracted and actually consist in a way of lifting
the infinite set A to a finite one (Sections 8.1 and 8.2). Once these (in)consistency
proofs have been abstracted, we can use them in other (more general) settings. This is
illustrated in Section 8.3: we drop the restrictions of [JK86, Bac88] at a possible price
of nontermination, while keeping the refutation completeness and avoiding enumera-
tion of the Herbrand base.
Yet another advantage of our approach is to separate clearly the deduction phase
(computing overlaps of E into the conjectures), the computation of axiomatiza-
tions, and the (in)consistency proofs (i.e., lifting of the axiomatization and, roughly,
computing overlaps of A into c). Then it is possible to replace one of the pieces
with another (e.g., use another lifting), while keeping the other pieces (e.g., deduction
rules and axiomatization).
First, let us observe that we do not really need to consider the (in)consistency of
A _ [c] for an arbitrary nonground clause c. It follows from Lemma 8 and Theorems
18, 19, 24, 35, 39 that:
Theorem 51. Let A be a normal (resp. normal, resp. strongly normal, ...) I-axio-
matization. Let C0 , C1 , ..., Cn , ... be a fair induction derivation (resp. fair induction
derivation with selection, resp. fair restricted induction derivation, resp. reductively
fair induction derivation, resp. fair induction derivation with respect to conjecture
superposition with abstraction).
Then I<C0 if and only if, for every clause c # i Ci for every ground substitution _,
A _ [c_] is consistent.
Indeed, in the proofs of the theorems, we only use the above weaker assumption.
8.1. Jouannaud and Kounalis Approach
In this section we assume (as Jouannaud and Kounalis do [JK86]) that E is a
finite ground convergent rewrite system.
The idea is to lift A from the ground to the nonground level.
First, the predicate Red can be lifted to nonground terms by means of the following
finite set of Horn clauses:
SRed={
Red(l )
For every left-hand side l of a rule in E
Red( f (x1 , ..., xn)) o Red(xi)
For every function symbol f and index i.
The minimal Herbrand model of this set of clauses is exactly the set of reducible
ground terms.
The negation of Red is computed as explained in Section 7.3, yielding a finite set
of Horn clauses ScRed such that cRed(s) holds in the minimal Herbrand model of
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SRed if and only if ScRed<cRed(s). It corresponds actually to a finite tree
automaton with disequality constraints (see [CJ97]).
Example 52. Consider the following very simple example of integers with addi-
tion: function symbols are 0, s, p, +, and E=[0+x=x; s(x)+ y=s(x+ y),
p(x)+ y= p(x+ y), s( p(x))=x, p(s(x))=x]. cRed is defined by the following set
of Horn clauses:
cRed(x)  P(x) 6 N(x)
P(0)
ScRed={N(0)P(s(x)) o P(x)N( p(x)) o N(x).
Next, we replace the equality symbol in c with a new binary predicate symbol eq,
yielding a clause c~ . Finally, A can be lifted into the set A ,
A =[\x .eq(s, t) O Red(s) | s, t # T(F, X), so t] _ [\x .eq(x, x)] _ ScRed ,
where x is the set of variables occurring in s, t and o is the lifting of the ordering
to the nonground level.
Lemma 53. Let A be the normal axiomatization of Section 7.4. A _ [c_] is
consistent for all ground substitutions _ if and only if A _ c~ is consistent.
Proof. A _ [c_] is inconsistent if and only if
1. for every positive literal s=t in c with s_o t_, s_ is irreducible.
2. for every negative literal s=t in c, s_ and t_ are identical.
By definition, this implies that ScRed <cRed(s_); hence A$<ceq(s_, t_), which
shows that A _ c~ is inconsistent.
Conversely, if A _ c~ is inconsistent, then there is a ground substitution _ which
falsifies c~ . This implies that, for every negative literal cs=t # c, s_ and t_ are
identical and that, for every positive literal s=t in c, ScRed _ [eq(s_, t_)] is incon-
sistent. Then, assuming s_ot_, s_ must be irreducible. It follows that A _ [c] is
inconsistent. K
There is still a problem since A is still infinite. However, if, for every positive
equation s=t in c, s and t are comparable in the ordering o, then (dis)proving the
consistency of A _ c~ amounts to (dis)proving the consistency of the finite set of
clauses:
[Red(s) | so t, s=t # c] _ ScRed .
On the other hand, if c is an equation s=t where s, t are incomparable, A is
infinite, which corresponds to a failure case in Jouannaud and Kounalis method.
This is not fully satisfactory and has been answered by Bachmair, as explained in
the next section.
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However, if a failure does not occur, Lemma 53 together with Theorem 51 allows
to use a general-purpose (in)consistency prover, encompassing Jouannaud and
Kounalis method: when Jouannaud and Kounalis’s method does not fail, we have
to check the consistency of a finite set of clauses without equality and, when their
method fails, we have to check the consistency of an infinite set of clauses without
equality.
Finally, let us point out that, under Jouannaud and Kounalis hypotheses, Red is
a recursive predicate on nonground terms (i.e., it is possible to decide whether
ScRed<_x .cRed(s)). There are several proofs in the literature (from [Pla85] to
[CJ97]). This implies the decidability of the consistency of an equation with A.
The dedicated proofs of ground reducibility are certainly more efficient than the
general method (inconsistency proof) we are currently designing. But, of course, we
have more freedom, both in the design of A and in the axioms E we can handle.
8.2. Bachmair’s Approach
Bachmair implicitly uses in [Bac91] the same axiomatization as in Jouannaud
and Kounalis’ approach (with the same hypotheses on E), but with a different
(more adequate) lifting at the nonground level. Now, instead of A , we consider
B={
eq(x, y) O Red(x) 6 Red( y) 6 x#y
eq(s, t) O Red(s) For all terms s, t such that so t
eq(x, x)
ScRed _ Sc# ,
where # is the syntactic equality on ground terms (whose negation can easily be
defined by a finite set of Horn clauses Sc#).
Note that the first axiom is not necessarily a consequence of the second set of
formulas when s, t are not comparable at the nonground level. Similarly, the second
set of formulas is not a consequence of the first axiom since s may be both irreducible
and strictly larger than a reducible term t.
Lemma 54. B _ [c~ ] is consistent iff A _ [c] is consistent.
Actually, the same result holds if we remove either of the two first lines in the
definition of B.
This improves over A since, now, for every clause c, we can compute a finite
subset Bc of B such that Bc _ [c~ ] is consistent iff B _ [c~ ] is consistent: it suffices
to restrict the second line in the definition of B to the pairs of terms s, t such that
s=t occurs in c. (We may also simply not consider the second line in the definition
of B, but we keep it because, in case this clause applies, it will result in more
efficient inconsistency proofs.)
Another slight extension would consist in merging the two cases, considering the
more elegant axiomatization
B$=[(eq(x, y) 7 x> y) O Red(x)] _ ScRed _ Sc# _ S>
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(where S> is a definition of o) of which all axioms in Bachmair’s axiomatization
would be a consequence. Again, the consistency of A _ [c] would be equivalent to
that of B$ _ [c~ ]. However, we know that the consistency of B _ [c~ ] is decidable,
but the decidability of the consistency of B$ _ [c~ ] is an open problem, even if the
interpretation o of > is an RPO.
8.3. The General Case
For arbitrary Horn clauses with equality, the reducibility predicate can be
defined as in Section 8.1. We need, however, the equality:
Red(s) o s1=t1 7 } } } 7 sn=tn 7 s>t
SRed={ for every clause s1 {t1 6 } } } 6 sn{tn 6 s=tRed( f (x1 , ..., xn)) o Red(xi ).
Using the method described in Section 7.3, we can compute an axiomatization
(assuming that there is no variable occurring in the conditions which does not
occur in the corresponding body). We get a finite set of clauses Sr of the form
cRed(s) o s$1{t$1 7 } } } s$m {t$m 7cRed(u1) 7 } } } 7 cRed(uk)
7 v1>w1 7 } } } 7 vp>wp 7 x1 t1 7 } } } 7 xq tq
using the totality of the ordering on ground terms. Now, we get an automaton with
semantic constraints. In the pure equational case, we get an automaton with
disequality and inequality constraints. If, moreover, every equation can be oriented
we are back to an automaton with disequality constraints. Finally, if t#t1 # } } } #
tn#true we are back in the scope of the previous section.
Unfortunately, nothing guarantees in general that the semantic constraints can be
eliminated. This is a problem: even if the theory in which the disequality constraints
are interpreted is restricted to AC (associativity and commutativity), Red may be
no longer recursive [KNRZ91]. Even if there are no disequality constraints s$i {t$i ,
Red is no longer recursive, as shown as a side result in [CNNR98].
Let Br be the set B of axioms, replacing ScRed with Sr .
Lemma 55. Br _ E _ [c~ ] is consistent if and only if for every ground substitution
_, A _ [c_] is consistent.
As before, for every clause c, we only need a finite subset (known in advance) Brc
of Br. Hence, together with Theorem 51, we have the desired set of axioms.
However, this lemma is not fully satisfactory in general as, for the inconsistency
proof, E has to be considered again. There are, however, several restricted classes
for which the disequalities s$i {t$i are not present in Sr . In such a case, B$ _ [c~ ] is
consistent if and only if for every ground _, A _ [c_] is consistent. We give below
two such examples, illustrating the benefits of our general setting.
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First when the negative literals in the clauses of E are always of the form s=true
or s= false (i.e., Boolean equations), there is no disequalities in Sr (and hence no
need for E in the previous lemma). This is illustrated in the next example.
Example 56. This is a natural definition of finite sets (of, say, natural numbers,
but it does not matter here). Function symbols include ins (binary), < (constant),
and # (binary). # and ins are defined by
ins(x, l )=l o x # l
{x # ins( y, l ) o x # lx # ins(x, l )
(the =true have been removed for the predicates definitions). Note that there is no
finite set of free constructors and that there is no purely equational specification.
The first computation step gives a definition of the membership predicate and of
the reducibility predicate for lists:
{ x # l o _y, l $ .x # l $ 7 l#ins( y, l $) 6 _l $ . l#ins(x, l $)Red(l ) o _x _l $ . l#ins(x, l $) 7 x # l $.
The second step negates both sides:
{ x  l o (\y, l $ .x  l $ 6 lins( y, l $)) 7 \l $ . lins(x, l $)cRed(l ) o \x \l $ . lins(x, l $) 6 x  l $.
The last step is quantifier elimination, the patterns being inserted back in the
body of the clause:
Sr={
x  <
x  ins( y, l $) o yx 7 x  l $
cRed(<)
cRed(ins(x, l )) o cRed(l ) 7 x  l.
And E is not needed in A as there is no (semantic) disequality constraint in Sr .
Another example which illustrates this method is the way AC symbols can be
handled. Assume that the ordering on terms is a lexicographic path ordering and
that + is associative and commutative. Let t be any ground term which is minimal
in its equivalence class. A subterm of t which is headed by + has the following
restricted syntactic form, +(t1 , +(t2 , ..., +(tn , tn+1)...)) (i.e., it is a right comb),
where t1 , ..., tn are not headed with + and t1 } } } tn+1 . Sr , which specifies the
minimal terms in each equivalence class, is defined accordingly. In general this
yields a definition of Sr which does not contain disequalities, but may contain
ordering constraints. Let us give an example (in which even ordering constraints
are not necessary):
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Example 57. Assume F=[0, 1, +, V] and
x+ y=y+x
x+( y+z)=(x+ y)+z
x+( y+z)=y+(x+z)
E={ 0+x=x0 V x=01 V x=x
(1+x) V y=y+(x V y).
The four first equations E0 form a saturated set (see [MN90]) and E is a reductive
definition w.r.t. E0 .
Sr specifies the irreducible ground terms w.r.t. E0 :
Sr={
cRed(0)
cRed(x) o NZ(x)
NZ(1)
NZ(1+x) o NZ(x).
9. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
The method of proofs by consistency has lost part of its popularity since it was
developed in the early 1980s. The main reasons are its requirements: pure equational
specifications (this is not true of some extensions such as in [BL90] for Horn clauses),
ground convergent presentations, and its inefficiency, due to the divergence of
completion.
Here we have generalized the technique, taking advantage of the powerful recent
developments on saturation methods for first-order theorem proving. This was
possible because of the generalization of ideas already present in [Fri84, KM87]
for pure constructor systems: give explicitly a first-order axiomatization which
reduces inductive proofs to proofs by consistency.
Besides this generalization (the introduction of I-axiomatizations) we have shown
how to generalize the proofs by consistency methods to Horn clauses and arbitrary
clauses, taking advantage of ordered strategies, and we have also shown how to
drop the ground convergence requirement for constructor specifications.
Regarding future work, apart from studying further possible applications to other
semantics like behavioral ones, we are seeking for more significant examples that could
be automatized using the Saturate system, in order to investigate up to which degree
the methods are automatizable and how they compare with the other existing methods.
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